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Why US electric deregulation could stall
by Edward L. Flippen
USA Today (2 August 
2000) reports that 
power supply outages 
are now more likely 
because electric 
generation reserves 
have not kept pace with 
growth. A news story in 
Time (17 July 2000) 
claims that electric 
utility deregulation, 
which was supposed to
,rJL Flippen lQwer prices thrOUgh
competition, is instead causing rising prices, particularly 
in California and New York. Likewise, the Los Angeles Times 
(29 July 2000) reports that deregulation in California is 
increasingly being judged a costly disappointment or even 
failure.
PRICE INCREASES
It appears that price increases in states such as 
California, where deregulation is underway, are the 
naysayer's 'proof that regulation   not deregulation   is 
best for consumers. Indeed, similar assertions are being 
made in states where deregulation has barely began, and 
particularly, by regulators who have predicted doom and 
gloom even before it has been fully implemented. The New 
York Times (8 August, 2000) has even declared in a recent 
editorial that '[deregulation has caused upheaval around 
the country ... '
Regrettably, given the current regulatory climate in 
some states where deregulation is underway, it is likely 
that electric deregulation 'US style' will not garner the 
consumer benefits that competition should produce. 
Simply put, competitive market prices may not develop 
because regulators have made it clear that they do not 
trust markets and so have sought to impose various layers 
of regulation in the name of 'consumer protection'. Even 
in Virginia, where the legislature studied deregulation for 
three years before developing electric deregulation 
legislation, regulators have taken steps to ensure that 
post-deregulation electric prices do not exceed what 
prices would have been 'but for' deregulation. 
Interestingly, this was done in the name of consumer 
protection.
The Virginia Electric Utility Restructuring Act will 
phase in electric generation competition from 2002 
through 2004. It also directs regulators, beginning in
2004, to designate default suppliers to serve customers 
who, for various reasons, do not utilise competitive 
suppliers. In recent orders issued in cases involving 
Allegheny Power Company and Delmarva Eight and Power 
Company, two incumbent Virginia utilities, the regulators 
accepted settlements negotiated by the commission staff 
and parties in those cases. By doing so, they made clear 
that generation prices for default service provided by 
those two utilities will be determined on a cost basis, just 
as if electric generation were still regulated. Such cost- 
based pricing effectively becomes a 'price cap' in a 
competitive market. That means the regulators will go 
along with electric competition if it develops lower prices 
than could be determined based on the cost of existing 
generating facilities, but if prices rise above the cost for
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existing facilities, cost-based pricing will apply. In other 
words, electric prices will be cost or market, whichever is 
lower.
Sounds great, but who really believes a vibrant 
competitive market will develop under such 
circumstances? Competitors considering states imposing 
indefinite price ceilings will know that there is no upsideF o I
potential. If prices fall, they can freely compete for 
customers. If prices rise, however, they will lose their 
customers to generating affiliates of existing utilities that 
are likely to be required to be the default suppliers by 
regulators. Why would rational businessmen and women 
invest in a competitive environment that has no upside? 
Indeed, if it is only acceptable that prices can go down, is 
it really a competitive market? Of course not, but it makes 
for good sound bites.
Fortunately, in Virginia there is still time to do things right 
from a long-term perspective. Though rulings in the two 
cases mentioned above are final, Virginia regulators are
now conducting a more generic proceeding that couldo o r o
result in the adoption of a rational set of rules on this 
subject for the vast majority of Virginia's electric 
companies and their customers.
PRICE CEILINGS
With competition come long-term lower prices but 
also, short-term price fluctuations. Indeed, it is the price 
fluctuations that attract the long-term investment. Ando
from such investment emerges the type of technology 
changes that have sustained America's unprecedented 
economic growth. Unfortunately, regulators, thinking they 
are doing the right thing for consumers by ordering price 
ceilings as they implement deregulation, could cripple the 31
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potential for significant new investment in electric 
generation facilities and, ultimately, the development of 
competitive markets and lower prices.
Their timing could not be worse. According to datao o
developed by the North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC) and the Edison Electric Institute, 
significant new investment in generation will be required 
in the immediate future. Between 1988 and 1998, the 
annual consumption of electricity increased 27 per cent. 
During the same period, installed generating capacity 
increased only 9.2 per cent. The result is that capacity 
reserve margins have declined from 20 per cent in 1988 
to 10.8 per cent in 1998, with most of the decline 
occurring between 1993 and 1998   from 16.7 per cent 
to 10.8 per cent or a decline of 35 per cent in just five 
years. That's the bad news. The good news is that after 
years of less than robust construction activity, the 
beginning of deregulation has brought a flood of proposals
for new generating plants. According to a release by theo o r o j
Electric Power Supply Association (ESPA) (8 June 2000), 
new plant additions in the planning stage now total 
177,000 megawatts   more than triple what was on the 
drawing board in October 1998. Officials with ESPA and 
NERC, however, caution that without the actual 
construction of such projects, future reserve margins will 
be dangerously low.
SHORT-TERM INCREASES FOR LONG-TERM 
GAIN
Allowing competition to develop will bring significant 
long-term benefits to the US economy, but prices may not 
always decline. For example, according to a May 1999 
report by the UK Office of Electricity Regulation, average 
UK electric rates declined in real terms between the onset 
of deregulation in 1990 and 1998, although prices 
sometimes rose in the initial years following deregulation. 
But between 1995 and 1998, electric prices declined in 
real terms by between 18.2 per cent and 19.3 per cent, 
depending upon the payment terms between customers 
and their electric suppliers. (Customers agreeing to 
monthly direct debit terms received the largest
reduction.) What is important is that the UK market was 
allowed to develop even if it meant price increases in the 
short term. Notably, short-term prices did increase.
The uncertainty of when and how deregulation would 
take place resulted in electric utilities scaling back their 
generation investment plans until there was more
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certainty about deregulation. But, just as the 'certainty 
picture' is developing, now some regulators are making 
assertions about the failure of competition before it can 
fully develop and other regulators are implementing 
pricing ceilings, thus ensuring that competition will not 
fully develop at all. The long and short of it is that there is 
more uncertainty today than there was yesterday, so there 
is less likelihood that businesses will make the generation 
investments that have been announced. Duke Energy 
North America, for example, has plans to build 3,000 
megawatts of new generation in California, but willo o '
reconsider its plans if California re-imposes regulation, as 
recently proposed by Governor Davis.
There are huge resources at stake in the electric 
industry. Industry revenues are estimated at $200 billion 
per year and total industry investment capital is around 
US$700 billion   almost ten per cent of total US capital 
investment. The potential cost savings and technology 
improvements from electric deregulation could be 
enormous, but the benefits will only happen if state 
regulators are willing to accept any potential short-term 
pain for the long-term gain. If they consider price 
fluctuations as bad politics   and politics more important 
than economics   electric deregulation could be on the 
verge of stalling at a critical state in its development. If that 
happens, the US economy will be the loser. ®
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